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Abstract
Engagement with sociological perspectives can enrich an understanding of  medical law and provide a basis
for critique of  certain of  its key premises. Since both law and healthcare are frequently conceptualised and
analysed as systems, the theoretical frameworks developed by Niklas Luhmann and Gunther Teubner would
seem to offer particular promise in this regard. This article explores a particular area of  medical law to
which an understanding of  the social (and political-economic) context of  decision-making is of  clear
importance – adjudication upon the allocation of  scarce resources – in order to identify what insights may
be gained from an approach grounded in systems theory.
Keywords: judicial review; healthcare; resource allocation; systems theory.
Introduction: medical law and the uses of sociology
There appears little room for argument today that medical law ‘has achieved an enduringplace at the pedagogical table’, alongside more traditional subjects of  academic legal
study.1 Yet, notwithstanding its status as a ‘vigorous, dynamic and eclectic field of  cross-
disciplinary and international scholarship’,2 the relative youthfulness of  the sub-discipline
means that there remains ample scope for innovative investigation of  synergies with other
fields of  inquiry. Such an exercise may serve several valuable goals, including deepening
comprehension of  emerging and evolving norms, identifying new modes of  addressing
problems, and illuminating potential pathways for future development.
A related, but arguably distinct, rationale for embarking upon such exploration might
be located in a sense of  discomfiture with certain of  the foundational tenets of  medical
law, the objective being the critical reassessment of  the validity of  these in light of  the
understandings which may be gleaned from beyond its boundaries. One such matter
which has been subject to such analysis is the centrality accorded to bioethical principles
as yardsticks by means of  which the normative structures of  medical law may be
understood and evaluated. 
This critique of  ‘bioethics-centrism’ has emerged from various quarters. From the social
sciences, the argument is posited that the ‘highly rational, formal, largely deductive mode of
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argumentation’ which bioethics embodies cannot readily be translated into practical
scenarios:3 hence, that ‘applied ethics’ rests upon the naive and mistaken premise that ‘social
reality cleaves down neat philosophical lines, with theoretical categories matching those in
social reality: i.e. that what a philosopher says is the doctor–patient relationship actually
represents the relationship between doctors and their patients in all settings’.4
Comparable voices can be heard emanating from within the legal academy. For
Montgomery, the traditional conception of  ‘medical law [as] a species of  applied ethics,
implying a staged process of  applying ethical principles to a problem and deriving the
necessary legal rules from that application’5 has resulted in a disjuncture between theory
and practice. He therefore calls for a ‘new paradigm’ for medical (or healthcare) law,6 in
which medical law is set in its ‘institutional context’,7 and which makes use of  norms
created by and within the medical professions and the NHS rather than viewing these as
‘forces to be constrained’ by the application of  external rules.8 Similarly, Veitch argues
that it is:
. . . essential to complement the existing, and dominant, critical form of  analysis
within the academic medical law literature – one based on ethics and the ethical
supportability of  court decisions and laws – with one whose critical eye is directed
towards the more mundane, though by no means less important, institutional
apparatus that structures aspects of  how the courts function in this area.9
Most recently, Harrington has proposed a rhetorical analysis of  medical law, challenging
the perceived orthodoxy that ‘ethics is held to be the truth of  the law in this area: that
which the law must strive for, though often failing in doing so’.10 He focuses instead upon
legal speech as ‘a site of  struggle between rival common-sense notions of  the nature of
society and its values, and the relationship of  both to the law’.11
There are important differences between these accounts, but what unites them is both
an attentiveness towards the social and political context in which medicine – and medical
law – sit,12 and, relatedly, a critical posture towards the apparent hegemony of  bioethics,
which is regarded as too detached from lived experience to properly account for practice
in the clinic (or the courtroom). This appears to create a distinct space in which
understandings drawn from sociology might prove of  particular utility. The focus of  the
latter upon the manner in which ‘institutions provide procedures through which human
conduct is patterned’,13 allows us better to comprehend, inter alia, ‘how ethical questions
are not separable from the relations of  powers in which ethical dilemmas emerge and are
resolved’, and ‘how individuals draw on existing cultural resources which are embedded
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in their everyday experiences as a way of  tackling ethical questions’.14 However, with
limited exceptions (including aspects of  the work of  two of  the legal scholars identified
above),15 this disciplinary intersection between medical law and sociology has been
sparsely explored.
Considerations of  space necessarily preclude this article from undertaking a
comprehensive exploration of  the contribution which sociology can make to a better
understanding – perhaps, a thoroughgoing reconceptualisation – of  the fundamental
tenets of  medical law. Rather, it seeks to offer an illustration of  the insights that work in
this field can offer by focusing upon a discrete subcategory: judicial scrutiny of  the
allocation of  scarce healthcare resources. For at least two reasons, this would appear to
be a topic which especially lends itself  to being viewed through a sociological lens. First,
perhaps more visibly than in any other context within medical law, decisions which fall to
be scrutinised by the courts in this field are structured by the institutional context in which
they are taken: whether funding is made available for a particular treatment sought by a
patient will turn upon a series of  organisational choices which are reflective of  the
relations of  power both within, and external to, the allocative decision-making body.
Secondly, the propensity to resort to litigation regarding allocative choices is explicable,
at least in part, by reference to broader social trends such as: enhanced health literacy,
especially in relation to the introduction of  new technologies; the rise of  patient pressure
groups (supported in some cases by pharmaceutical companies seeking enhanced return
on research and development costs); a more consumerist approach to healthcare as a
commodity, and so on. 
For similar practical reasons, this article will limit its consideration of  sociological
approaches to those of  the ‘system theorists’, in particular Niklas Luhmann and Gunther
Teubner. It is submitted, however, that these contributions are especially apposite to the
subject-matter surveyed here. Adjudication of  healthcare allocation questions is a practice
which sits at the intersection of  two forms of  social organisation which both can be, and
have been, profitably analysed in systemic terms: law and healthcare.16 As will be
discussed more fully below, systems theory provides us with particular insights into the
manner in which communication can occur between these ostensibly dissimilar ways of
ordering and perceiving the world and, correspondingly, an explanation of  the dynamics
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of  change which is referable to social and organisational factors,17 rather than premised
upon adoption of  a universalist worldview. It therefore promises a distinctive theoretical
framing which may function as a corrective to a bioethics-centred approach to the analysis
of  legal norms and their ongoing development.
The goal of  this article, therefore, is to explore judicial decision-making on allocation
of  scarce healthcare resources in English courts in light of  the understandings provided
by systems theory, with a view to identifying the insights which the latter may bring to
analysis of  the former. In order to pursue this, it is necessary first both to outline how
the law has evolved in this field, and the manner in which that evolution has ‘traditionally’
been framed.
A narrative of judicial scrutiny of resource allocation
This section presents a tripartite categorisation of  the activity of  the English courts in
relation to adjudication upon allocative questions in healthcare.18 While admittedly
somewhat crude – especially as there are not neat chronological boundaries between the
categories (in particular, the second and third) – such classification is, it is submitted,
valuable in directing attention away from the particularities of  individual cases, thus
facilitating consideration of  the broader social and political trends within which the
decisions are set while simultaneously allowing examination of  the evolution of  relevant
jurisprudence. 
As Newdick notes, the first judicial review of  an allocative decision made within the
NHS ‘surprisingly’ did not occur until 1980;19 this fact in itself  may be framed within a
sociological lens, as discussed subsequently. These early cases, up to the decision of  the
Court of  Appeal in R v Cambridge Health Authority, ex parte B in 1995,20 were characterised
by judicial deference or ‘passivity’.21 Judges did not consider allocative questions to be
wholly non-justiciable, since they retained the capacity to intervene on Wednesbury
grounds, but this test was applied in a very strict manner with the consequence that
allocative decisions were, in effect, insulated from any meaningful judicial scrutiny, even
on procedural grounds. This position is perhaps best captured by R v Central Birmingham
Health Authority, ex parte Collier,22 where access to intensive care facilities were denied to a
child with a life-threatening condition who had been placed at the top of  a waiting list for
treatment. Here, Stephen Brown LJ stated that:
. . . it is not for this court, or any court, to substitute its own judgment for the
judgment of  those who are responsible for the allocation of  resources . . . The
courts of  this country cannot arrange the lists in the hospital, and, if  it is not
evidence that they are not being arranged properly due to some unreasonableness
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in the Wednesbury sense on the part of  the authority, the courts cannot, and
should not, be asked to intervene.
A different approach to the judicial role in this field may be traced to the decision of  the
High Court in ex parte B,23 with the principles which were articulated by the courts in a
series of  subsequent cases eventually being placed upon a statutory footing by secondary
legislation accompanying the publication of  the NHS Constitution in 2009.24 Here, judicial
scrutiny is of  a considerably more intensive quality than was previously the case: Newdick
labels it ‘hard look’.25 However, while the ‘trigger’ for review remains the most
substantive of  the grounds of  judicial review – irrationality – the obligations imposed
upon the allocative decision-maker by law (whether common law, or statute/NHS
Constitution) are procedural in character. These take two forms. First, the decision-maker
is required – in the words of  Laws J in ex parte B – to ‘explain the priorities which have
led them to decline to fund the treatment’:26 that is, in effect, to provide reasons for the
decision not to fund a particular intervention. Secondly, a procedure must be in place
whereby an individual can put forward factors which constitute their particular case as
exceptional, thereby warranting departure from a general policy not to provide access to
a treatment or service.27 This provides for a mode of  participation in the process of
allocation, understood in a Fullerian sense as the presentation of  proofs and reasoned
argumentation for a decision in favour of  the patient.28
In both of  the preceding instances, the approach adopted by the courts is relatively
unambiguous, but there is a further category of  case in which the position is less clear-
cut. Here, the basis of  challenge lies in the application and interpretation of  the evidential
base upon which allocative choices have been premised. The NHS Constitution includes
a right, said to be rooted in administrative law, ‘to expect local decisions on funding of
other drugs and treatments to be made rationally following a proper consideration of  the
evidence’.29 In this context, however, rationality is framed by some courts in a more
substantive manner than in the cases previously discussed, turning upon the relevancy of
considerations, the existence of  evidence reasonably capable of  supporting the decision,
and the analysis and application of  that evidence. Hence, in R (Otley) v Barking and
Dagenham NHS Primary Care Trust,30 the refusal to provide funding for a cancer drug was
held to be unlawful, inter alia, on the basis of  a misapplication of  evidence on clinical
effectiveness contained in guidance produced by (what was then) the National Institute
for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE); in R (Ross) v West Sussex Primary Care Trust,31
the Trust had acted unlawfully because it had failed ‘to understand the strength of  the
evidence in favour of  treating [the patient]’ in light of  a ‘fundamental misunderstanding
Healthcare resource allocation in the English courts 115
23   [1995] 1 FLR 1055. This decision was overturned by the Court of  Appeal (n 20), but it nonetheless laid the
basis for future jurisprudence in the area: see K Syrett, ‘Institutional Liability’ in J Laing and J McHale (eds),
Principles of  Medical Law (4th edn, Oxford University Press 2017) [7.71].
24   See now National Health Service Commissioning Board and Clinical Commissioning Groups (Responsibilities
and Standing Rules) Regulations 2012, SI 2012/2996, regs 34, 35.
25   Newdick (n 19) 100.
26   Above (n 23) 1065.
27   The process is known (in England) as the Individual Funding Request. For an example, see NHS England,
Commissioning Policy: Individual Funding Requests (NHS England 2017).
28   See L Fuller, ‘The Forms and Limits of  Adjudication’ (1978) 92 Harvard Law Review 353, 364.
29   Department of  Health, The NHS Constitution for England (Department of  Health 2015) 7.
30   [2007] EWHC 1927 (Admin).
31   [2008] EWHC 2252 (Admin).
of  the results’ of  randomised controlled trials of  the treatment;32 and because it ‘fell into
error when considering [the] cost-effectiveness’ of  the drug;33 and, in R (Rose) v Thanet
Clinical Commissioning Group,34 albeit obiter,35 Jay J considered that departure from (non-
binding) NICE guidelines in respect of  the strength of  the clinical evidence base for a
treatment amounted to ‘an irrational conclusion and, in particular, one whose reasoning
is without foundation’.36
However, in other cases, courts have taken a more deferential stance towards the
allocative decision-maker’s analysis and application of  evidence. Thus, in R (AC) v
Berkshire West Primary Care Trust,37 the Court of  Appeal ruled that the trust was entitled to
take the view that the evidence of  clinical effectiveness was insufficiently strong to
warrant funding breast augmentation surgery for transsexual patients, while in R (British
Homeopathic Association) v NHS Commissioning Board38 (a case turning on the fairness of  a
consultation process rather than rationality), it was held that ‘it would not be appropriate
for the court to pass judgment on the legitimacy or otherwise of  the view that
homeopathy works’, notwithstanding acceptance by the board ‘that there is a body of
opinion, to which some practicing clinicians adhere, that homeopathy works (and that
there is evidence to that effect)’.39 It should be noted, also, that three challenges to
recommendations made by NICE turned on procedural grounds relating to the
accessibility of  the economic models on which NICE decisions rested and on the
provision of  adequate reasons, rather than on the Institute’s understanding and
application of  evidence and the selection and weighing of  data.40 Yet, even within this
small subcategory of  allocation case, there is judicial ambivalence regarding the
substantively deferential position.41 Albeit obiter, the Court of  Appeal in R (Servier
Laboratories Limited) v NICE ‘was by no means convinced’ that the Institute’s rejection of
post-clinical trial subgroup data in its evaluation of  clinical effectiveness of  a drug was
rational, attaching particular weight to the fact that the European Medicines Agency had
taken account of  such data when carrying out its regulatory functions.42
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Ways of seeing:43 analysing the narrative
How might this narrative be interpreted? A standard framing is to view it as reflective of
evolving jurisprudence: developments and modifications in the selection and application of
grounds of  judicial review understood within the broader context of  English public law.44
This is the approach taken by Newdick,45 who considers the case law on access to hospital
care under the three main heads of  review articulated by Lord Diplock in the GCHQ case,46
and within the category of  irrationality (under which most of  the cases discussed above
fall), outlines a trend – noted above – from ‘judicial passivity’ to ‘the hard look’. He
attributes the latter shift to changing understandings of  the meaning of  the irrationality
ground, citing a dictum of  Lord Woolf  MR, in which the judge identified ‘two faces’ of
irrationality: ‘the barely known decision which simply defies comprehension’ (which
underpins the passive stance) and ‘a decision which can be seen to have proceeded by
flawed logic’ (which underpins the more interventionist ‘hard look’ form of  scrutiny).47
This interpretation satisfies some of  the criteria outlined in the work of  the legal
academics cited in the first section of  this article – for example, it provides a response to
Veitch’s questions: ‘If  some judges are willing to be more proactive, then how, precisely,
have they been so? What techniques have they used to assert their power . . . ?’48 It is
notable, however, that Newdick attributes the change in the judicial approach to
irrationality to broader doctrinal developments in public law – especially a greater
emphasis on the requirement for administrative bodies to give reasons for decisions49 –
rather than to any changes in the social and political context of  allocative decision-
making. Furthermore, this account stops short of  analysing the developing law in terms
of  the ethical principles which might be said to underpin it, as much medical law
scholarship tends to do.50
In this regard, the work of  the present author provides an alternative reading,
although in a manner which is somewhat distinct from the ethically informed analyses
offered in respect of  other topics in the field of  medical law. Hence, it is argued that the
shift towards a procedural form of  review, post-ex parte B, can be understood as a way of
judicially enforcing the ‘accountability for reasonableness’ model developed by Norman
Daniels and James Sabin.51 This model is ethically informed in so far as it centres upon
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chs 1 and 2.
51   See e.g. N Daniels and J Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly: Learning to Share Resources for Health (2nd edn, Oxford
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Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University Press 2007) 100–8; also K Syrett, ‘NICE and Judicial Review:
Enforcing “Accountability for Reasonableness” through the Courts?’ (2008) 16 Medical Law Review 127. See
also Wang (n 18).
(distributive) justice, but it is purportedly neutral as to the ethical substance of  allocative
choices – for example, whether these seek to give effect to utilitarian or egalitarian
considerations.52 This is because there appears to be no societal consensus upon the
appropriate ethical basis for allocating scarce healthcare resources,53 and thus the best
that can be achieved is a fair process for making such decisions which will ensure that they
are publicly regarded as legitimate. 
Those critics of  ‘bioethics-centrism’ whose work was outlined earlier in this article
might feel some discomfiture with an analysis which understands legal developments in
the light of  one of  Beauchamp and Childress’ famous four principles of  biomedical
ethics (albeit one which, being procedural in orientation, lacks the absolute, universal
quality of  other ethical principles which may be at play in medical law cases).54 However,
the present author has sought additionally to situate the ‘accountability for
reasonableness’ thesis within the socio-political context of  a changing NHS. In particular,
a shift from implicit to explicit modes of  priority-setting has been viewed as the backdrop
for the evolution from judicial passivity to procedural scrutiny, with the judicial stance
serving to reinforce the legitimacy of  the prevailing form of  allocation.55
More recently, a further reading of  the development of  the case law has been offered
by Wang. This also attaches strong weight to judicial compliance with ‘accountability for
reasonableness’ as an underlying driver for the evolving jurisprudence. However, it seeks
to distinguish itself  from the work of  the present author in that it confers primacy upon
the legal norms, rather than regarding these as having been shaped by the surrounding
socio-political environment. Arguing against the latter position, on the basis that
‘correlation is not causation’,56 Wang claims that ‘it is actually the rigorous judicial
scrutiny of  rationing decisions that has driven the NHS to be more explicit about the
reasons and procedures leading to the denial of  treatment, rather than the other way
round’,57 drawing attention also to the need for NHS decision-makers to make decisions
‘judge-proof ’, that is ‘to avoid, respond to, and comply with judicial review’.58 He regards
the broader development of  English public law, especially ‘the affirmation of  the
language of  rights’ and a growing tendency to require reasons to be presented for
decisions,59 as a ‘better . . . explanatory variable’ for the evolving law in this field than a
shift from implicit to explicit rationing.60
Wang’s critique of  the conflation of  correlation and causation appears somewhat at
odds with his statement that judicial scrutiny is the driving force underpinning
increasingly explicit decision-making within the NHS, although elsewhere he is more
guarded, noting that isolating the impact of  litigation upon bureaucracies which are
subject to multiple pressures is problematic, and claiming more modestly ‘that courts
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57   Ibid 652–3. 
58   Ibid 668.
59   Ibid 654–5. Cf  Newdick (n 49) and accompanying text.
60   Ibid 656.
interacted within a “soup of  influences” that created a context that made rationing more
explicit’.61 What is most interesting about his analysis, however, is that it demonstrates
both the ample scope which remains for debate as to the nature of  the interaction
between the law and the surrounding socio-political environment in this field, and the
continuing primacy of  bioethical understandings (in this instance, manifested in the
framing of  the evolving case law as a shift towards ‘accountability for reasonableness’). 
As argued in the first section of  this article, adoption of  a systems theory perspective
carries the potential to further illuminate these matters, as well as another issue mentioned
only passingly by Wang: the (tentative) emergence of  a third category of  review which is
more substantive in character.62 The remainder of  this article will accordingly seek to
explore the insights which systems theory can provide in this context. 
Applying systems theory to allocative case law
Mele, Pels and Polese have provided a helpful definition of  a system as ‘an entity, which
is a coherent whole such that a boundary is perceived around it in order to distinguish
internal and external elements and to identify input and output relating to and emerging
from the entity’.63 A systems approach is holistic, not reductionist: it ‘analyses a
phenomenon seen as a whole and not as simply the sum of  elementary parts’.64 This
makes it a valuable perspective for the analysis of  the deeper-rooted causes of  broad-
ranging shifts that occur over time, such as those analysed in this article. The following
discussion will therefore offer an explanation of  the salient points of  systems theory and
will seek to apply these to the developments in allocative jurisprudence outlined above.
(I) FUNCTIONAL DIFFERENTIATION, OPERATIONAL CLOSURE AND JUDICIAL PASSIVITY
While originating in biology, systems theory rapidly came to be applied within the social
context, with the concept of  autopoiesis forming a central organising principle. This
connotes ‘the process of  a system that produces “itself  from itself ”’,65 that is one in
which elements of  the system interact with each other to produce and reproduce the
system without direct reference to the external environment. Such systems are thus
operationally closed: the system defines its own boundary which separates itself  from the
environment, this giving rise to its autonomous character. 
For Luhmann, this autopoietic reproduction takes place by means of
communication,66 the ‘core of  social systems’.67 ‘What is essential for an autonomous
social autopoiesis is the conceptualization of  society as a system of  meanings, developed
through a process of  differentiation’:68 that is, the emergence of  functionally
Healthcare resource allocation in the English courts 119
61   Ibid 658.
62   Citing Otley (n 30) and Ross (n 31), Wang merely remarks that ‘based on divergent expert opinions, the courts
also challenged the health authorities’ analysis of  the scientific evidence and the conclusion that the claimant’s
case was not exceptional’: (n 18) 650. This seems to understate the distinctiveness of  the form of  scrutiny
exercised by the courts in these cases. 
63   C Mele, J Pels and F Polese, ‘A Brief  Review of  Systems Theories and Their Managerial Applications’ (2010)
2 Service Science 126, 127.
64   Ibid.
65   Ibid 128. 
66   See N Luhmann, ‘The Autopoiesis of  Social Systems’ in F Geyer and J Van d Zeuwen (eds), Sociocybernetic
Paradoxes: Observation, Control and Evolution of  Self-Steering Systems (Sage 1986) 174.
67   M Schwaninger and S Groesser, ‘Operational Closure and Self-Reference: On the Logic of  Organizational
Change’ (2012) 29 Systems Research and Behavioral Science 342, 344.
68   A Lourenço, ‘Autopoietic Social Systems Theory: the Co-Evolution of  Law and the Economy’ (Centre for
Business Research, University of  Cambridge Working Article No 409 2010) 3. 
differentiated social subsystems,69 such as law, politics, the economy and religion, which
operate to reduce the complexity of  the world through the absorption, processing and
return of  information through their own particular, distinct ways of  ‘seeing’ and
‘understanding’. The boundaries of  these systems are formed by way of  binary codes
such as (in the case of  law), ‘legal/illegal’, which serve therefore both to identify the
subsystem and to distinguish it from its environment,70 that is to effect its operational
closure. Put differently, those participating in the making of  legal communications
‘operate on the basis of  shared assumptions about “boundary conditions” which
demarcate the legal order from other forms of  communication: what counts as a legal
rule, and what does not’.71 Meanwhile, elsewhere (for example, in the realms of  politics
or religion), there exist other shared understandings based around different demarcations
of  those subsystems from their environment (the legal system then forming part of  that
environment). 
While Luhmann did not write as extensively on medicine or healthcare as he did on
other fields such as law, with the consequence that ‘sociological systems theory has been
applied to analyses of  health only marginally’,72 he assumed ‘“treatment of  disease”,
“treatment of  ill persons” or “medicine”’ to have evolved into a functional social
subsystem.73 The binary code applicable to this context might be obvious – ill/healthy –
or might be more complex, for example hindering/promoting health,
suboptimal/optimal physical and mental health or, in the public health context,
presence/absence of  pathogenic factors.74 As for the medium of  communication which
applies within the system, Pelikan disputes Luhmann’s claim that there is none,75 and
argues that this resides in the science-based system of  medical terminology for
differential diagnostics, and for the related system of  therapies, defined in medical
textbooks, handbooks, journals and reviews.76 This latter point will be revisited below. 
An acceptance that medicine/healthcare can be viewed, alongside law, as a social
subsystem allows us a means of  framing both the non-involvement of  the courts at all
prior to 1980 and the subsequent highly deferential judicial stance towards allocative
challenges in early case law on the topic. The consequence of  functional differentiation
between operationally closed subsystems, effected through distinctive coding, is that ‘the
highly specialised types of  communication developed within the subsystems of  society
are no[t] . . . interconnected or interchangeable, and attempts to artificially impose one
type of  systemic communication on another fail’.77 Law and medicine (or healthcare) are
distinct and autonomous social subsystems, defining themselves with regard to their
environment in terms of  differing binary codes. The two subsystems ‘see things
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differently and there is no possibility of  one system being able to internalise the world-
view of  another’.78
In this sense, there is a profound problem of  judicial (in)competence:79 courts are
quite simply not suited to determine questions of  this type because they do not fit with
the manner in which the legal system sees the world. This is well captured by the dictum
of  Ralph Gibson LJ in Collier.80 The judge bemoans the deficiencies of  the allocative
decision-making process undertaken by the health authority, but acknowledges that law is
utterly impotent to address them:
If  I were the father of  this child, I think that I would want to be given answers
about the supply to, and use of, funds by this health authority. No doubt the
health authority would welcome the opportunity to deal with such matters so that
they could explain what they are doing and what their problems are. But this
court and the High Court have no role of  general investigator of  social policy
and of  allocation of  resources.
The existence of  functionally differentiated, operationally closed social subsystems, the
boundaries of  which are defined by codes, gives rise to what Luhmann has described as
a ‘paradox’. The system is what it is because of  what it is not, and every determination of
legality within the legal system contains within it the possibility that it might have ‘gone
the other way’.81 But this paradox must be managed by the system, since to expose it
would result in a form of  existential paralysis: as Luhmann writes, ‘one can neither ask
nor answer the question (because it would lead to a paradox) as to whether the distinction
between legal and illegal itself  is legal or illegal’.82 Such management (or
‘deparadoxification’) takes place through a process of  concealment, which will commonly
take the form of  a ‘mix of  distinctions within the law and displacements to other
decision-makers’.83
This process can be seen in operation in the early judicial review case law. The
differentiation between law and healthcare is not manifested in complete abdication by the
courts of  any form of  adjudicative role whatsoever, since this would amount to an
acknowledgment of  the (arbitrary) distinction between law and non-law and thus
exposure of  the ‘paradox’. Rather, a strategy of  concealment is adopted, beneath the
‘ample cloak’ of  the Wednesbury principle.84 This enables judges to define such matters
within the terms of  the system’s binary coding of  legal/illegal and, simultaneously, to
displace decision-making in practice to those operating within the healthcare system by
adopting the most restrictive reading of  this ground of  review, which in effect divests the
courts of  the task of  reaching a determination on the issues of  allocation.
(II) STRUCTURAL COUPLING AND JUDICIAL INTERVENTIONISM
Systems theory thus provides an alternative perspective which can assist in explaining a
phenomenon which is relatively well understood – the standpoint of  judicial passivity, and
78   M King and C Thornhill, Niklas Luhmann’s Theory of  Politics and Law (Palgrave Macmillan 2005) 25.
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82   N Luhmann, Law as a Social System, K Ziegert (trans) (Oxford University Press 2004) 177.
83   Harrington (n 10) 23.
84   The phrase derives from J Jowell and A Lester, ‘Beyond Wednesbury: Substantive Principles of  Administrative
Law’ [1997] Public Law 368, 371.
the rationales for this position.85 However, the particular value of  adopting a sociological
approach to medical law surely lies primarily in its capacity to cast fresh light on issues
which are less settled, such as the basis for a shift to a more interventionist judicial stance
on allocation questions. In order to explore its contribution in this regard, it is necessary
to outline additional elements of  the theory. 
As a starting point, it is important to note Luhmann’s statement that ‘closure must not
be misunderstood as isolation’.86 While social subsystems are operationally closed, they
are cognitively open – they have ongoing contact with the external environment and can
receive information from it, but (as discussed in the preceding section) this information
is processed in forms which are specific to its own ‘way of  seeing’ (its code), and is then
returned to the environment as a communication from, and in the terms of, that
subsystem (such as a legal ruling). 
Central to processes of  interaction between a social subsystem and the other social
subsystems which constitute its environment is the notion of  ‘structural coupling’, which
captures the ‘idea of  highly selective connections between systems and environments’.87
‘This designates that different systems may co-evolve over time and systematically
communicate about the same themes and within specific contexts, but in their specific
and different codes’.88 Some examples may be of  assistance in understanding this
concept. A structural coupling between the distinct subsystems of  law and politics is
effected through constitutions: ‘a constitution is the paradox that brings together law and
politics precisely by keeping them separate (namely, by allowing both law and politics to
restrict the influence on each other)’,89 structural coupling between the subsystems of  law
and the economy is effected through mechanisms such as contract and property;90 and
structural coupling between politics and the economy through mechanisms such as taxes
and tariffs.91
It should be noted that, in each of  these cases, notwithstanding the coupling, the
different subsystems are and remain separate, with the information emanating from the
external environment being ‘sorted’ into the subsystem’s distinct code. Thus, external
pressures generated from the environment do not operate as direct inputs into the
subsystem – Luhmann writes that ‘the twin concepts of  closure and structural coupling
exclude the idea of  information “entering” the system from the outside’.92 Rather,
structural coupling ‘can only trigger irritations, surprises and disturbances’,93 which may
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(or may not) eventuate in internally constructed processes of  adaptation and mutation.94
Mechanisms of  structural coupling thus provide spaces through which ‘perturbation’
from the environment is experienced, providing the subsystem with a ‘chance to learn and
transform its structures’.95 Hence, as Teubner notes, ‘co-evolving systems exert an
indirect influence on each other’.96
These further features of  systems theory provide a framework through which it is
possible to interpret a number of  aspects of  the evolving jurisprudence on allocative
matters. 
First, they suggest that ‘legal and social changes are . . . related but distinct processes.
Legal change reflects an internal dynamic which, nevertheless, is affected by external
stimuli and, in turn, influences the external environment’.97 An autopoietic approach
‘does not rule out causation: it assumes a complex causal relationship between sub-
systems, thus rejecting the view of  linear causation in favour of  one based on mutual
influence’.98 This tends to support Wang’s more modest claim relating to the ‘soup of
influences’,99 in which law and the health system interact with each other to construct an
environment in which allocative decisions are more explicit in character. The two
subsystems underwent a process of  co-evolution and thus attempts to locate the ‘drivers of
change’ either in the shift to explicit rationing processes in the NHS (a position which is
attributed by Wang to the present author), or the development and articulation of  public
law principles (Wang’s claim) are equally misplaced, premised as they both are on an
input/output model. It is simply not possible, in Luhmannian social systems theory, for a
change in the character of  resource allocation to directly modify the legal approach (or,
correspondingly, for a change in the legal regime to directly alter the manner in which
rationing takes place): ‘only the law decides on this’.100
However, as we have seen, a social subsystem is far from isolated from its
environment and can (although not necessarily will) be affected by ‘perturbations in the
other social system [which] will trigger there some changes governed by the internal logics
of  this world of  meaning’.101 In the context explored here, this raises a second issue: that
is, the mechanisms through which the subsystems of  law and medicine/healthcare are
structurally coupled, such coupling being the locus of  perturbation which may ‘provoke
change on the other side’.102 In particular, given that the initial period surveyed here was
analysed as characterised by closure, rather than coupling, we might ask whether
structures of  coupling have emerged over the period dating from the Hincks case in 1980.
Epistemological developments in the field of  medicine appear to provide the key here.
In recent decades, both in the UK and elsewhere, the practice of  ‘evidence-based
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medicine’ (EBM) has secured hegemonic status, gradually (albeit not wholly) supplanting
a more experiential approach of  clinical judgement, rooted in trial and error, and personal
observation. EBM, defined as ‘the conscientious, explicit, and judicious use of  current
best evidence in making decisions about the care of  individual patients’,103 is, in principle,
scientific, objective and data-driven (as discussed further below). When initially applied to
the allocative context in the NHS during the early 1990s, EBM facilitated the elimination
of  ‘waste’ on clinically ineffective treatments.104 Subsequently, stimulated by the
development of  the sub-discipline of  health economics105 and the emergence of  ‘the first
cousin of  EBM’,106 health technology assessment (HTA) (in which regard the UK was a
pioneer through the establishment of  NICE in 1999), it additionally afforded a basis for
prioritising certain treatments and services over others on grounds of  cost-effectiveness.
Of  course, evidence and its attendant discourse has always been central to the ‘world
of  meaning’ of  law. EBM thus opened up a distinct space for structural coupling between
this subsystem and that of  medicine/healthcare. A particular mechanism by which such
coupling was realised was the clinical guideline, a specialised form of  the science-based
medium of  communication identified by Pelikan.107 Guidelines, regarded as the ‘main
vehicle for implementing EBM’,108 function within the medicine/healthcare subsystem as
statements of  recommended best practice with a view to enhancement of  the quality of
healthcare and the minimisation of  clinical variation; this was especially the case following
the establishment of  NICE in 1999 given that these were stated as the Institute’s primary
objectives109 Within the legal subsystem, in accordance with its distinct coding, they
provide presumptive evidence of  what constitutes a lawful standard of  care or, in the
allocative context, of  a rational exercise of  administrative discretion.110
This brings us to a third issue, which is to identify the manner in which the legal
subsystem responded, by means of  its own processes and operations, to the perturbation
in the medical/healthcare subsystem caused by the shift to this new basis for clinical
practice. Here, it is important to understand EBM, and latterly HTA, as rationalist forms
of  activity in so far as they seek to determine ‘the one best option’ in a given situation,
following an identification of  the issue, an analysis of  the alternative means of  addressing
it, an evaluation of  the consequences of  adopting each of  the alternatives, and a
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comparison of  the consequences with the objectives.111 Priority-setting decisions in
healthcare which are explicitly premised upon these approaches can therefore be seen as
manifestations of  rationalist policy-making.112
The social subsystem of  law also obliges decision-making to be characterised by
rationality, through the mechanism of  judicial review. Hence, although guidelines may
constitute the primary mechanism through which coupling is brought about, the
underpinning of  that coupling resides in a shared commitment by both subsystems to the
value of  rationality. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the perturbation in the legal subsystem,
experienced through forms of  coupling centred upon the collection and application of
evidence, manifests itself  in an adaptation of  law’s construction of  the ground of
irrationality as the basis of  what it regards as an inappropriate (and therefore unlawful)
mode of  decision-making. Thus, as the earlier narrative outlines, there has been a shift in
the law’s stance on what constitutes an irrational decision in the healthcare allocation
context, from an egregious decision which is ‘outrageous in its defiance of  logic’,113 to
the more frequently witnessed one which is seen to be based upon ‘flawed logic’. But this
evolution takes place within the terms and processes established by the legal subsystem,
not as a direct input from the medicine/healthcare subsystem. Hence, if  (following
Newdick) we take Lord Woolf ’s dictum in Coughlan as expressive of  this evolution,114 it is
notable that ‘the second face’ of  irrationality is justified on the basis of  (admittedly
imprecise) legal precedent (‘as it has developed in modern public law’) and of  existing –
not novel – jurisdictional reach (‘another aspect of  the decision which is equally the
concern of  the law’).115 This fits with Teubner’s notion of  ‘self-referential closure’ as
characterising an autopoietic system of  law, signifying:
. . . the circular relation between legal decisions and normative rules: decisions
refer to rules and rules to decisions . . . references to external factors, e.g. politics
or religion, are replaced by references to legal rules (stemming from court
decisions, doctrinal inventions, or legislative acts).116
The preceding account offers a way of  comprehending the broad shift from judicial
deference to interventionism and the legal means by which this is achieved, but it does
not specifically enable us to distinguish between, and understand, the variants of  ‘hard
look’ scrutiny which, as outlined above, range from the procedural to the much more
substantive. However, deeper investigation of  the nature of  EBM as a rationalist activity
can be of  assistance in this regard. 
EBM may be understood, in Weberian terms, as an illustration of  instrumental
rationality, ‘that is determined by expectations as to the behaviour of  objects in the
Healthcare resource allocation in the English courts
111  See C Lindblom, The Policy-Making Process (Prentice Hall 1968) 12. The close correlation to EBM can be seen
from the description of  the core of  the practice of  the latter as consisting of  five steps: (i) formulation of
clinical questions; (ii) searching for the best evidence; (iii) critically appraising this evidence; (iv) applying this
evidence to patients; and (v) evaluating the impact of  this application: R. Upshur and C Tracy, ‘Legitimacy,
Authority, and Hierarchy: Critical Challenges for Evidence-Based Medicine’ (2004) 4 Brief  Treatment and
Crisis Intervention 197, 198.
112  See J Russell and T Greenhalgh, ‘Being “rational” and being “human”: How National Health Service
Rationing Decisions Are Constructed as Rational by Resource Allocation Panels’ (2014) 18 Health 441; T
Tenbensel, ‘Health Prioritisation as Rationalist Policy Making: Problems, Prognoses and Prospects’ (2000) 28
Policy and Politics 425.
113  CCSU (n 46) 410 (Lord Diplock).
114  See above (n 47) and accompanying text.
115  Coughlan (n 47) [65] (Lord Woolf  MR).
116  G Teubner, ‘Autopoiesis in Law and Society: A Rejoinder to Blankenburg’ (1984) Law and Society Review 291,
295.
125
environment and of  other human beings; these expectations are used as “conditions” or
“means” for the attainment of  the actor’s own rationally pursued and calculated ends’.117
As Schwandt argues:  
[This form of] rationality is monological and a matter of  having the correct
procedure for constructing descriptive, interpretive, and/or evaluative
statements, assertions or claims about various kinds of  “objects” that are
evaluated. This approach, in turn, is wedded to a model of  strategic political
action aimed at “solving problems” in social programming. Administrators and
policymakers seek to manage economic and social affairs “rationally” in an
apolitical, scientized manner.118
Hence, under this approach, the focus is upon the gathering of  ‘better evidence of  “what
works” in terms of  policy intervention’:119 the best such evidence being ‘that which is
derived through quantitative methodologies, empirically-tested and validated’.120 In the
case of  EBM, this is manifested in a hierarchy of  evidence reflective of  the propensity of
the method to avoid bias, in which epidemiological evidence derived from systematic
reviews and meta-analyses of  randomised controlled trials sit at the top, and unsystematic
clinical observations lie at the foot.121
With this analysis in mind, we might plausibly read contentious judgments such as Ross
and Otley and obiter dicta in Rose and Servier Laboratories, where judges connect irrationality
with a misunderstanding or misapplication of, or departure from, evidence, merely as
further instances of  law’s adaptation to the external stimulus of  EBM through its own
internal processes for ‘seeing’ and ‘understanding’ the environment. These judges articulate
a ‘legal construction of  social reality’,122 through continued invocation of  the ground of
irrationality, but they choose to do so in a way which explicitly foregrounds EBM’s
objective, quantitative and rationalist forms of  knowledge as the bases of  logical – and
therefore lawful – decisions. It might, perhaps, be said that there is evidence of  especially
close structural coupling between the subsystems of  healthcare and law in these cases. 
However, this particular filtering of  the external pressures of  EBM into the normative
structures of  the law is far from unproblematic. Drawing on the notion of  the self-
referential closure of  a system,123 Deakin and Carvalho observe that:
. . . the essential characteristic of  the order of  the legal system as a system of
communication is the importance of  its internal congruence . . . the agents who
participate in the making of  legal communications do so on the basis of  a set of
shared understandings about the nature of  the legal system. It is on this basis that
the legal system can be said to “reproduce itself ” over time.124
The question which arises, therefore, is whether the approach taken in these cases
complies with ‘shared understandings’. Of  course, in one sense it does so, since it falls
under the head of  irrationality and, as noted above, Lord Woolf ’s explanation of  the
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‘second face’ of  this ground may be viewed as an exercise in self-reference. From another
standpoint, however, the more expansive reading of  the ground, which (as argued
previously) appears more substantive in orientation than is usual, does not appear wholly
consistent with a broadly shared understanding permeating most of  the remainder of  the
case law on allocation of  scarce healthcare resources – from the decision of  the High
Court in ex parte B onward – that the focus of  review should lie with the process of
decision-making. This lack of  congruence affords an explanation for the ambivalent
stance of  the courts in the third category of  allocative case identified previously in this
article: other judges do not share the same understandings as to the nature and scope of
the irrationality ground as their brethren presiding in these cases. 
This connects closely to a further, and final, question about the possible future
direction of  judicial activity in this decision-making context. What might insights from
systems theory tell us about the likelihood of  judges continuing to cleave to the
‘traditional’ approach to allocative choices, in which the emphasis is primarily upon
procedural aspects of  the decision, as against a more substantive reading in which the
understanding and application of  evidence is much more closely scrutinised? 
As we have seen, since the legal system is cognitively open to its environment, it
possesses the capacity to adapt to external stimuli experienced via mechanisms of
structural coupling. But systems theory teaches us that such adaptation is neither
automatic nor complete, since ‘the scope for legal variation is constrained by the need to
maintain the legal system’s autonomy and internal consistency’.125 It follows that there is
no inevitability that a more substantive reading of  irrationality in this context will
eventually secure hegemonic status, even though it may constitute a ‘better fit’ with the
environment (at least so long as EBM retains its hegemonic status). The key, rather, is
‘how far [the revised reading] operate[s] consistently with the internal categories of  legal
analysis’.126 Here, it is pertinent to remind ourselves that, while judicial scrutiny of
healthcare allocation has been analysed in this article as if  it were a discrete, autonomous
field, it functions in reality merely as a subset of  the broader law of  judicial review.127
Both congruence, and the scope of  adaptation, can therefore only fully be understood by
reference to that wider jurisprudential context. This is because:
. . . it is a feature of  legal orders that the meaning which they create refers to a
shared perception that individual legal communications are linked together to
form a coherent body of  norms. In other words, for the agents who operate
within and by reference to it, an understanding of  the legal system cannot be
obtained from an analysis of  isolated elements, but derives from the process of
self-observation of  the system as a ‘whole’.128
Accordingly, it is necessary to look beyond the law on healthcare allocation to ascertain
whether that which has been identified here as a more substantive reading of  the
irrationality ground links coherently with norms elsewhere; if  it does so, then there is
much greater likelihood of  future development in this direction. The position here is
somewhat unclear. Historically, close scrutiny of  the evidential basis for a decision has not
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formed an important part of  the court’s role in a judicial review case.129 However, there
are indications that this may be changing, in particular because of  the increased use of
the proportionality standard. Since this test can be seen to ‘reflect appropriate means-end
rationality’,130 it is inevitable that ‘judicial assessments of  proportionality often depend
upon complex empirical questions’.131 A growing (albeit incomplete) convergence
between this standard and the ground of  irrationality, which has support from some
academics and judges,132 would point to the potential for increasing coherence between
the more substantive mode of  judicial interventionism grounded upon close scrutiny of
the evidential basis for decisions, and broader systemic norms: but there remains some
distance to travel. Consequently, the ambivalent judicial stance outlined previously seems
likely to persist for the time being.
Conclusion 
The last point serves as a valuable reminder that an approach to the understanding of
medical law (or any other field of  law) which is informed by understandings drawn from
systems theory need not, and should not, render ‘traditional’ doctrinal legal analysis
redundant. This is unsurprising, because Luhmann considers legal argumentation, which
includes the reasoning of  judges deciding a case in a particular way, to amount to one of
the principal ways in which communication – which lies at the heart of  his theory –
occurs within the legal system.133
That said, systems theory adds an important dimension to a purely doctrinal
approach, in the form of  its attentiveness to the social context in which law sits.
Superficially, this seems paradoxical given the emphasis of  the theory upon the autonomy
of  systems, including law, but it must be remembered that the autonomous nature of  a
system comes about by way of  differentiation from a surrounding environment, and that systems
are cognitively open to that environment. This provides a means of  comprehending legal
change, which is triggered through structural coupling. The argument posited in this
article is that an increased focus upon evidence as the basis for decisions in healthcare,
manifested in particular in clinical guidelines and founded upon instrumental rationality,
coupled the systems of  medicine/healthcare and law together and simultaneously
operated as a perturbation to the legal system. 
However, systems theory also rejects a straightforward ‘input–output’ (or ‘stimulus–
response’) model of  interaction with the environment. This casts doubt upon analyses
which seek to explain developments in legal norms as caused by external pressures (or vice
versa), such as shifting approaches to allocative decision-making in the NHS. Rather, the
pressures from the environment (such as those created by the rise of  EBM) are received
within and constructed by the legal system’s own normative criteria, since ‘the legal
system models the environment in its own terms’.134 In the field surveyed here, this is
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manifested in developments in the ground of  irrationality in respect of  questions of
healthcare allocation, but the consistency of  certain of  these developments with the wider
body of  norms is questionable, giving rise to some uncertainty as to the future pattern of
evolution in view of  the importance of  internal congruence to the effective operational
performance of  the legal system.
In sum, this article has sought to demonstrate that a systems theory perspective can
assist in building an enhanced understanding of  this area of  medical law. However, the
utility of  this approach surely extends well beyond this particular context. To illustrate
this, a final point may be considered:
For Luhmann . . . ‘truths’, which assume the existence of  some external,
objective arbiter of  rightness . . . stand in the way of  any ‘sociological’
understandings of  the contingent nature of  society. They are remnants of  the
Enlightenment notion of  ‘perfection’ through which precise external causes
could be identified for each evident imperfection in society, and ‘naturally good’
and ‘naturally bad’ explanations and solutions could be readily distinguished from
one another.135
Systems theory therefore teaches us, through its foundation in the functional
differentiation of  society, that no single ‘view of  the world’ predominates. Here lies the
basis of  a further challenge to a view of  medical law which takes bioethics as central.136
It is through a capacity to yield insights of  this type that systems theory demonstrates its
value, and it is submitted therefore that it is worthy of  careful consideration by anyone
seeking to analyse and explicate the present terrain, or to map the future trajectory, of
medical law.
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